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The end of radical concept nativism

Created by
  • Haebom

Author

Joshua S. Rule, Steven T. Piantadosi

Outline

This paper presents a counterargument to Jerry Fodor's radical concept nativism. Radical concept nativism claims that learning new concepts is impossible and that most concepts are innate. This paper examines the limitations of previous counterarguments and shows that radical concept nativism is inconsistent with actual human cognition in three key aspects related to expressive power, conceptual structure, and concept ownership. Using computer science and information theory, we formalize the relevant concepts more scientifically and ultimately support the idea that humans learn new concepts.

Takeaways, Limitations

Takeaways: Provides a powerful refutation of radical concept innateness, supporting the possibility of new concept learning from computer science and information theory perspectives. Deepens the understanding of human concept learning, and provides new perspectives for cognitive science and philosophy.
Limitations: Further validation of the generality and scope of the proposed formalized model is needed. A more comprehensive account of the actual human concept learning process may be needed. Discussion of other variants of radical concept innateness may be lacking.
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