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Horus: A Protocol for Trustless Delegation Under Uncertainty

Created by
  • Haebom

Author

David Shi, Kevin Joo

Outline

This paper proposes a protocol to ensure the correctness of autonomous AI agents in dynamic and low-trust environments. The agent delegates tasks to sub-agents and secures the correctness of the tasks through a recursive verification game in which the agent stakes a bond to verify the correctness of the tasks. Tasks are published as intents, and solvers compete to perform the tasks. The selected solver performs the task at risk, and the correctness is verified ex post facto by the verifier. Any challenger can initiate the verification process by challenging the results, and incorrect agents are penalized, while agents who present correct counterarguments are rewarded. There is an upward trajectory in which incorrect verifiers are also penalized. When the incentives of the solvers, challengers, and verifiers are aligned, the falsification condition makes the correctness a Nash equilibrium.

Takeaways, Limitations

Takeaways:
A novel approach to ensuring the accuracy of autonomous AI agents in low-trust environments
Presenting the possibility of building a distributed verification system through a recursive verification game
Proposing a mechanism to induce accuracy into Nash equilibrium through incentive design
Limitations:
Need for review of actual implementation and performance evaluation of the proposed protocol
Research on optimization of incentive design and adaptability to various environments is needed.
Need for analysis of the complexity and cost of the verification process
Further research is needed on resistance to malicious actors
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