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Probing Latent Subspaces in LLM for AI Security: Identifying and Manipulating Adversarial States

Created by
  • Haebom

Author

Xin Wei Chia, Swee Liang Wong, Jonathan Pan

Outline

This paper addresses the safety issue of large-scale language models (LLMs) that are vulnerable to adversarial manipulations such as jailbreaking via prompt injection attacks. We investigate the latent subspaces of safe and jailbroken states by extracting the latent activations of the LLM. Inspired by the dynamics of the human-attractor network in neuroscience, we hypothesize that LLM activations settle into metastable states that can be identified and perturbed to induce state transitions. Using dimensionality reduction techniques, we project the activations of safe and jailbroken responses to reveal the latent subspaces in low-dimensional space. We then derive perturbation vectors that, when applied to safe representations, move the model to jailbroken states. The results show that these causal interventions lead to statistically significant jailbroken responses for some prompts. We also investigate how these perturbations propagate through the layers of the model, and whether the induced state changes are locally maintained or cascade throughout the network. The results indicate that targeted perturbations induce distinct changes in activations and model responses. This research paves the way for potential proactive defenses that move from traditional safeguard-based methods to preemptive and model-independent techniques that neutralize adversarial states at the representational level.

Takeaways, Limitations

Takeaways:
Provides new insights into LLM's jailbreak exploits.
We present the possibility of detecting and defending against model vulnerabilities through latent subspace analysis.
It demonstrates the potential for new defense strategies that go beyond traditional safeguard-based defense methods.
We present a new paradigm for adversarial attack defense through manipulation of the internal representation of the model.
Limitations:
Further studies are needed to determine whether the proposed method is effective against all types of prompt injection attacks.
Validation of the generalizability of the results to specific LLMs and prompts is needed.
Research is needed on its applicability and scalability to large-scale LLMs.
The interpretability and generalization performance of the developed disturbance vectors need to be improved.
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