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A minimal coalition logic

Created by
  • Haebom

Author

Yinfeng Li, Fengkui Ju

Outline

This paper examines coalition logic, a key logic in the logical study of strategic reasoning, and its model, concurrent game models. We argue that three assumptions (serializability, independence of actors, and determinism) in existing concurrent game models are too strong. We then propose a coalition logic based on a general concurrent game model that does not adhere to these assumptions, and demonstrate its completeness. This logic appears to be the minimum logic for reasoning about coalition power.

Takeaways, Limitations

Takeaways: By relaxing the constraints of existing coalition logic and presenting a more general and expressive coalition logic, it enables reasoning about diverse strategic situations. It provides a minimal logical foundation for reasoning about coalition power.
Limitations: Further research is needed to determine the practical applicability and effectiveness of the proposed general simultaneous game model and coalition logic. The applicability to more complex strategic situations or special circumstances should be examined. Empirical verification through specific application cases is necessary.
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