Why Are China's Super Apps So Successful?
Recently, I met someone who is fluent in Chinese through Skewer Coaching. We talked about apps that are frequently used in China, and I told them about the ones I have used. Even those who don’t know much about China have probably heard of WeChat. There is even a joke that you can’t do almost anything in China without WeChat. Ordering food, calling a taxi, shopping, making payments, and even using government services can all be done within WeChat. Compared to KakaoTalk or Naver, which are commonly used in Korea, it offers a much wider range of functions within a single app. Is this “super app” phenomenon in China simply because Chinese people prefer convenience? Or is there another reason? When explaining the differences between Eastern and Western app design, it is often said that "Asians like apps with a lot of information and complexity, while Westerners prefer simple apps." However, this is not actually the case. Recently, apps in Asian countries such as China, Korea, and Japan have also gradually changed to a cleaner and simpler design. Nevertheless, why have super apps become so strong in China? The starting point of the 'mobile first' era that began with smartphones In the early 2010s, the Internet was not yet fully established in China. At that time, the Internet penetration rate in China was less than 35%, and there were not many people using desktop computers. In this situation, smartphones became the first personal computing devices for Chinese consumers. Since the mobile-centric Internet environment was built from the beginning, existing Internet habits were not formed. For example, in the US and Europe, desktop-based Internet usage habits such as web browsers and emails were already established, but in China, mobile apps were mainstream from the beginning. This gap was filled by Tencent's WeChat. WeChat started as a messenger, but began to provide almost all Internet services through 'Official Accounts' and 'Mini Programs'. In fact, WeChat is like a browser that acts as China's Google Chrome. Instead of moving existing web-based services to mobile, it created an app-centric environment from the beginning. Here, I always think of the words of Tencent Chairman Ma Huateng. When Tencent's QQ and games were ridiculed as copycats, Ma Huateng said, "We drew a tiger after seeing a cat." The early days of China’s digital economy were poorly developed. Banks did not provide consumer-friendly online payment systems, shopping was largely cash-based, and e-commerce was in its early stages of lack of trust. In this situation, Alibaba developed Alipay for online transactions on Taobao, creating its own payment system. Companies had to create their own services if they didn’t have what they needed. This is the real reason why super apps were born. In other words, it was an inevitable choice to fill a gap in the market and quickly take over the entire industry, not for the sake of an ideal user experience (UX). The emergence of the 'wall-building' competitive strategy The rise of China’s super apps can be explained by another reason: the extreme competition. Giants like Tencent, Alibaba, Baidu, and ByteDance have long used a so-called “walled garden” strategy, blocking links to each other’s platforms. For example, if you try to open a shopping link on Taobao in WeChat, it won’t work. So each company tries to pack as many services as possible into its own app. This has led to super apps like WeChat offering food delivery, taxi hailing, payments, shopping, and social media all in one app. Although the Chinese government only banned such link blocking in 2021, consumer habits have hardened and the super app model is deeply entrenched. Another reason can be found in economic terms. The online spending power of early Chinese consumers was lower than that of the West, so the lifetime value of each individual app was small. Accordingly, companies tried to maximize revenue per customer by providing as many services as possible to each customer. Also, because the initial cost of acquiring customers was very high, they integrated more services to avoid sending users to competitors once they had gathered users in one app. This was part of the strategy when Tencent ran the “red envelope (hongbao)” campaign during the Chinese New Year (CNY) to promote WeChat Pay. Strategic choice, not cultural preference The reason super apps succeed in China is not because of user demand, but because of a combination of unique market conditions: a mobile-first environment, lack of industry infrastructure, fierce competition, and low spending power. So should companies in other countries just copy the super app model? Not necessarily. Rather, the important lesson is to understand what drives product design decisions. Super apps aren’t always the answer. In some cases, it might be better to bundle multiple services into one app, while in other cases, it might be more effective to create a single app that provides the best user experience. In reality, WeChat is not a 'perfect super app' that can solve everything. The way it allows users to experience simple services through mini programs is essentially the 'Open Web' of the mobile environment. Users can experience the service in advance and then download a separate app if necessary. In Korea, there were some who once boasted that super apps were the future. But who actually achieved this? Personally, Toss is the only company that has truly achieved a super app. I think Toss's current app is the real beginning of this. The biggest Takeaways we can get from the case of China's super apps is to understand how business needs evolve products. After all, product growth begins not with user needs, but with strategic responses to the environment and market conditions that companies face. Personally, I think Korea is the place that most underestimates China's digital ecosystem and technological prowess. As I always say, if you go to a developed city in China or even Shanghai, you will realize that this is not the China I knew.
- Haebom

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